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Use case 079

Electronic Voting Machines

A deployment concept for electoral commissions, voting-system vendors, auditors and election security teams.

Deployment concept · Suitability unverified
Government, Public Safety and Defence

Why this environment matters

For electronic voting machines, the system captures and records voter selections at polling locations. The risk extends beyond a conventional endpoint: malicious software, unauthorised configuration or hidden persistence could alter records or undermine confidence in the result. A NØNOS deployment concept would treat every software component, data source and device interface as separately authorised rather than assuming that anything running on the host should be broadly trusted.

The security challenge

Public-sector systems hold authoritative records and powers that affect identity, liberty, property, emergency response and national security. Endpoint compromise can therefore create consequences far beyond data loss. For this system, the primary attack path is that malicious software, unauthorised configuration or hidden persistence could alter records or undermine confidence in the result. Conventional general-purpose hosts often place parsers, management tools, network services and privileged drivers in one broad trust domain, allowing a flaw in a low-value feature to reach a high-consequence function.

How the capsule model could help

NØNOS could be placed at the operator, gateway, edge or application-compute layer and configured to use signed, inspectable vote-capture capsules, strict device capabilities and resettable known-good election images with independent audit outputs. The most relevant controls are purpose-bound data access, attestation for privileged actions, controlled removable media and disposable trusted sessions. This would make privileges explicit: a service that reads a sensor, displays data or contacts a cloud API would not automatically be able to issue a physical command or use a signing key.

Separate address spaces and capability checks can limit cross-process reach. They cannot stop harmful use of legitimate permissions, prove AI decisions correct or substitute for domain-specific safety controls.

Deployment requirements

Government deployment would require formal accreditation, identity and records integration, accessibility testing, procurement assurance and controls appropriate to the information classification and public function.

Current public-beta limitations, hardware support and application availability must be assessed before any pilot. Neither this use case nor an industry source establishes NONOS certification or a current customer deployment.

Who could buy or integrate it?

  • Election authorities procuring voting equipment through formal tenders
  • Voting-system manufacturers selecting the embedded execution platform
  • Election service contractors integrating deployment and maintenance for jurisdictions

Industry examples: Election Systems & Software, Hart InterCivic. These are research prospects, not represented as NONOS customers, partners or endorsers.

Opportunity research

Separate the market from the model.

Published industry benchmark
US$45 million

US HAVA election security appropriation

United States and US territories · 2026 · annual budget appropriation

FY2026 federal funding appropriated for state and territorial election administration and security. Budget authority, not actual annual outlays, vendor sales, or total election spending. Excludes state matching funds.

Modelled global devices
500K–6M

Candidate OS endpoints

Hypothetical planning range · 2025

Low, hypothetical planning assumptions. Hardware eligibility, procurement and adoption remain unverified.

Illustrative annual licensing
$10M–$600M

USD / year at full model coverage

Device scenario × assumed US$20–$100 per device / year.

Not a revenue forecast, announced price or measured serviceable market.

Device calculation

Hypothetical global planning range, 2025 scenario: assume 500,000–2,000,000 polling locations hypothetically within electronic-voting jurisdictions × 1–3 candidate OS endpoints per site/asset = 500,000–6,000,000 endpoints. Counting unit: dedicated voting or ballot-verification computers; excludes paper-only locations. Site/asset counts and endpoint densities are author assumptions, not a measured installed base. Coverage is limited to the defined equipped subset; includes all candidate endpoints within that assumed subset. Hardware eligibility, certification, adoption and achievable NØNOS share are unverified; overlaps other cases.

Election Security Grant ↗

Context only, inherited market research; not a device/site denominator. Original monetary-market scope and geography are preserved in benchmark. This source does not establish the assumed worldwide site count or endpoint density.

How to interpret the figures

Adjacent or broader commercial market benchmark; not the NØNOS OS market, licensable-device count or revenue forecast.

Modelled candidate endpoints × assumed annual USD per-endpoint price. Price is an author assumption, not a vendor quote. Full-range mathematical scenario only: not a revenue forecast or TAM; excludes adoption timing, procurement, certification, support costs, channel economics and attainable market share. Case totals overlap and must not be added.

Inherited research compiled 13 Sep 2026; publisher estimates, not independently audited.

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